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State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are major players of influence in the world economy.  
In a 2009 survey amongst OECD member countries, the more than 2,000 SOEs representing 
a total value of $1.2 trillion accounted for 15 percent of aggregate GDP. Globally SOEs 
account for 20% of investment and provide between 5 and 40 per cent of national  
employment. SOEs are internationally the most likely suppliers of utilities. Additionally,  
in many countries they provide the core of the financial infrastructure, they govern and 
exploit natural resources and critical infrastructure, and, even in most well-established  
and competitive markets, they undertake large-scale manufacturing and provide major 
services. Notwithstanding the privatisation waves of recent decades, governments remain 
major owners of commercial enterprises in many parts of the world (World Bank, 2014; 
Wong, 2018). 
SOEs play a large role in modern economies and may be seen both as a vehicle for accelerating 
economic growth and a provider of public services and public values. In economies in the 
Middle East and North Africa, SOEs play a ‘fundamental role’, as they operate in crucial 
systemic sectors of the economies and provide important services to citizens (OECD, 
2019). 
Given their finance-intensive nature and their pivotal role in national economies, SOEs  
are especially vulnerable to corruption (OECD 2019). Internationally, there is universal 
agreement that the rationale for establishing and operating any SOE should be that the 
state exercises the ownership of SOEs in the interest of the general public. (OECD 2018). 
This makes auditing SOEs an essential task for supreme audit institutions, to establish 
whether SOEs are operating in the public interest, to ensure that the products and services 
provided by SOEs are efficient and effective, and also to ensure that their operation is fully 
transparent, accountable and compliant with laws and regulations. 
Operational audits of SOEs need to be based on accepted standards. From joint reports of 
international organisations like the OECD, the World Bank, IFC and the IMF, we can distil 
internationally accepted standards on:
a. the definition of an SOE; 
b. the rationale and aims of an SOE; 
c. good governance of SOEs. 
Definition of and rationale for SOE’s 
SOEs are internationally defined as ’any corporate entity recognised by national law as 
an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership’ (OECD, 2015: 14). An SOE can 
take different forms and pursue a wide range of activities. One of the aims of an SOE is to 
conduct activities of an economic nature.  
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2Governments can have multiple reasons for establishing SOEs. There is however inter-
national agreement that a fist fixed norm for establishing a SOE is that ‘the state exercises 
the ownership of SOEs in the interest of the general public. It should carefully evaluate and 
disclose the objectives that justify state ownership and subject these to a recurrent review’ 
(OECD 2015, 17).
Despite their crucial role in the economies of the Middle East and North Africa, there is 
very little data available on the ownership, regulation, objectives and output of SOEs. 
Generating this data is crucial for the efficiency of the individual SOEs and for the economic 
development of the country. Transparency and accountability are crucial for curtailing the 
unique governance and regulatory risks associated with SOEs. 
When SOEs operate inefficiently and are subject to weak governance arrangements, they 
can create a strain on public resources, crowd out more productive private-sector activity 
and, in the worst case, be used as tools for political patronage or for self-enrichment at the 
expense of society at large. This in turn can erode the trust of citizens, companies and 
investors in public institutions and markets’ (OECD 2019, 142).
There are several arguments for establishing an SOE (Christiansen, 2013; OECD, 2015). 
First, SOEs are used mostly for non-commercial activities, for example providing drinking 
water or electricity. In many cases, these activities might otherwise be carried out by 
government departments or autonomous institutions. 
Second, SOEs are used worldwide to exploit ‘natural monopolies’. These are industries 
with very high infrastructural costs, overwhelmingly favouring the largest (and often  
the first) supplier. This means that the production of multiple firms is more costly than  
production by a monopoly. Examples are rail, water treatment, sewerage and electricity 
(networks). 
The third reason is often related to a natural monopoly: incumbent operators or leaders  
in a particular industry. These kinds of operators are typically found in network industries, 
where, operating among a range of private operators, one incumbent operator has certain 
public-service obligations, such as to distribute mail to all parts of the country. 
The fourth reason for ownership is the assurance of services that are deemed crucial for 
the development of the whole economy. States regard outsourcing or privatising these 
service as being too complex or risky. Governments use this ‘imperfect contract’ argument 
for exercising public control of ports, shipping lines, airports and airlines. 
A sixth related argument for SOE ownership is industrial policy and development strategies. 
Strategies can take at least three forms:
1. There are offensive strategies, pursued by creating ‘national champions’, or to stimulate 
industrialisation. 
32. In defensive strategies, SOEs are used for protective purposes, especially in order to 
maintain a bigger share of employment than a private operator could, or to cater to 
specific political constituencies. 
3. A third strategy is proactive: governments use the externalities of the SOEs to stimulate 
broader economic development. This can take the form of a classic industrial policy or 
‘state capitalism’. A classic example is developing the infrastructure required to create  
a profitable private sector. 
The final reason for SOE ownership is political or strategic, i.e. the state wishes to exercise 
control for reasons of security (as in the case of the Suez canal) or for political reasons (as 
in the case of the media). 
SOEs are very influential in the economies in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA). 
Most SOEs operate in three sectors in the MENA area (OECD 2019):
• Services: In all MENA countries, governments own at least a minority share in large 
companies focusing on utilities (such as water and electricity), capital-intensive modes 
of transport (aviation, railways, shipping and ports) and finally in banking and telecoms.
• Minerals and hydrocarbons. This sector typically accumulates a large part of national tax 
revenues. Resource exploitation is the exclusive domain of national SOEs. 
• Manufacturing industry. Historically, government involvement in heavy, large-scale and 
capital-intensive industries (such as refining, steel and cement) was seen as method for 
industrialization; while involvement in labour-intensive industries stemmed from a 
desire to safeguard employment in the wake of job losses in other areas (such as cotton 
weaving). 
Internationally, there is a growing tendency to segment SOEs into explicit categories (such 
as natural monopolies, temporary financial interests and strategic interests). This helps to 
make the ownership objectives explicit, to increase accountability, and to facilitate executive 
management and control (Wong, 2018). 
Ownership models
There are different ownership models for SOEs. There is an international trend towards 
centralising the ownership of state-run companies. In this model, a central body sets 
financial targets, decides on strategic issues and monitors the performance of the state- 
owned portfolio. In the MENA area, the fully decentralised model is most common, and is 
shared with only three other countries in the world (OECD, 2019). 
In a fully decentralised model, each SOE is owned by various institutions, often line ministries. 
Ownership, regulation and governance vary from sector to sector. The public often perceives 
the SOE as being run de facto by the line ministry in question and the company as being an 
extension of ministerial power. 
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The OECD advises centralising the ownership role to a single or a coordinating body. This 
helps to separate ownership from the regulatory function, facilitates the implementation of 
a ownership policy and helps to form a single pool of experts at central level for accounting 
and reporting (OECD, 2018; 2019).
5Audit questions
The first steps in identifying the rationale, arguments and ownership models for SOEs  
(i.e. the SOE system)  follow a system-oriented audit approach (ISSAI 300/26; ISSAI 3100 
62/63). The system-oriented approach does not focus primarily on policy or goals, and 
instead looks at effective government systems as a condition for effective and efficient 
policies. This type of audit can use descriptive questions such as:
• What is the objective of the SOE system?
• Who are the responsible actors within the SOE system?
• What are the responsibilities of each actor in the SOE system?
• Which rules, regulations and procedures are relevant?
• What are the relevant information flows?
 
Once a big picture of the system of SOE ownership and rationale has been built up, more 
normative questions can be answered in the second stage. Suggested audit questions 
here are:
• Is there an official policy for state ownership of enterprises which maximises value for 
society and insures the efficient allocation of resources?
• Does the ownership policy set out the overall rationale and criteria for state ownership 
and the state’s role in the governance of SOEs?
• Is the ownership policy subject to procedures of political accountability and are results 
regularly disclosed and evaluated in the public domain?
The state’s role as owner
The state’s ownership role should be transparent, accountable and efficient. There are 
internationally accepted guidelines which help to ensure this role. The first thing is to 
establish a sound legal and regulatory framework for the ownership and corporate  
governance of SOEs. In order to create a level playing field with other businesses and  
decrease the tension of political involvement in the running of state companies the frame-
work must be explicit about the rationale and arguments for state ownership (World Bank, 
2018). 
Secondly, there should be a clear separation between the state’s ownership function on  
the one hand and the function of market regulation and other state functions that affect 
conditions for SOEs on the other hand. The objectives of the government’s SOE policy or 
of the ownership of an SOE need to be set or altered in a transparent way. An adequate 
ownership model helps to strengthen focus, consistency and transparency about owner-
ship. The ownership entity should be accountable to the relevant representative bodies 
and have clearly defined relationships with relevant public bodies, including the state 
supreme audit institutions.
In order to ensure that individual SOEs satisfy the objectives of the government’s SOE 
policy, there should be managerial autonomy for individual SOEs. This means that the 
government should not intervene in the management of an SOE. 
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guarantee equal opportunities for competitors and creditors, and to uphold property 
rights. As a guiding principle, SOEs should not enjoy favourable market conditions. This 
means that SOEs should not be granted tax or regulatory exemptions that do not apply  
to other firms, nor should they enjoy favourable terms for debts or loans. 
Transparency, accountability and disclosure in relation to SOE policies and the objectives 
and results of individual SOEs are crucial to ensure that public value is delivered. As an 
additional guarantee, policies should be evaluated periodically and SOEs should be scruti-
nised by means of a public audit. Transparency and disclosure are even more important  
in those cases in which SOEs combine public policy objectives and commercial activities. 
The separation of income and expenditure relating to public policy objectives from those 
relating to commercial activities helps to ensure this. The cost incurred by the state in 
paying SOEs to achieve certain public policy objectives should be publicly disclosed 
(OECD, 2018; World Bank, 2018). 
Text box: Activities performed by the Ministry of Finance
In many countries, a unit in a central ministry – typically the Ministry of Finance – is responsible for 
the financial management framework for SOEs and monitors their operations.  
 
This unit works in close collaboration with the macroeconomic unit and budget office at the Ministry 
of Finance to ensure that the costs and the budget transfers to SOEs, together with subsidies and 
(quasi-)tax  exemptions, government guarantees and other contingent liabilities are correctly 
estimated and included in the budget or fiscal risk statement.  
 
Additionally, the unit may have the following tasks (Allen & Vani, 2013):  
•   Coordinating overall financial reporting by SOEs; 
•   Reviewing SOEs’ strategic plans and financial forecasts;  
•   Reviewing the annual financial performance of SOEs;  
•   Providing consolidated financial data on SOEs for inclusion in the budget documents; 
•   Maintaining a database of performance information on SOEs, including their strategic objectives, 
      business and financial plans, financial performance, government guarantees, borrowing and debt  
      financing;  
•   Scrutinising requests by SOEs for government guarantees and other debt financing agreements;  
•   Identifying SOEs with high financial or corporate governance risks and advising the minister of  
      finance on remedying measures;  
•   Following up on the analysis and recommendations of the supreme audit institution on SOEs; 
•   Making assessments of capacity gaps in SOEs with respect to their financial reporting, management  
      capacities, corporate governance and the typical (financial) risks associated with SOEs. 
 
Such a monitoring unit can be effective only if it has the backing of an enforceable regulatory 
framework for SOEs. This means that a regime of administrative, financial and judicial sanctions 
should be part of the legal framework.  
 
Typical steps in the public financial management of SOEs by the central government (or the Ministry 
of Finance) consists out of the following steps. First, a strategy should be prepared for managing the 
7fiscal risks associated with SOEs. This strategy should be part of a broader government strategy for 
managing public assets and liabilities. The first step in this strategy is a comprehensive analysis of 
SOEs. In many countries, governments do not have complete information on all the enterprises that 
they own. After the government’s portfolio of SOEs has been mapped out, the next step is to 
compile financial and non-financial information on each SOE, including its subsidiaries.  
 
After this, the following measures can be taken: 
1.   Develop a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework for SOEs;  
2.   Establish a clear set of arrangements among central ministries for implementing the regulatory  
       regime;  
3.   Create an internal governance framework for SOEs, clearly defining the role and responsibilities  
       of the board of directors and the audit committee;  
4.   Introduce specific measures for strengthening the accounting and financial reporting arrangements 
       applying to SOEs, together with arrangements for external supervision by the supreme audit  
       institution and the legislature. 
 
Factors relating to the operations of SOEs that may create fiscal risks and potential costs for the 
state budget include the following:  
•   Macroeconomic: changes in exchange rates or international commodity prices.  
•   Operational: delays or cost overruns in implementing capital investment projects.  
•   Sectoral: changing costs of production or reduced market shares as a result of competition. 
•   Force majeure: natural disasters, civil strife and other uncontrollable risk factors. 
 
Key performance indicators (KPIs) typically used by the Ministry of Finance to minimise the potential 
costs for the state budget and assess the efficiency of SEOs include the customary financial ratios 
such as:  
•   Current ratio = current assets: current liabilities 
•   Debt to equity = total liabilities: equity 
•   Return on assets = net profit after tax or EBIT: total assets 
 
Since many SEOs in developing countries tend to provide critical (subsidised) public services, 
focusing solely on private-sector indicators undervalues the wider public value delivered by SEOs. 
This wider public value should be reflected by the KPIs used for SEOs. The picture on the left 
contains suggestions for other areas of public value creation by SEOs, while the diagram on the  
right helps to diagnose the decision-making process for state ownership (PWC, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8Audit questions on state ownership
If a government’s policy on SOEs is well-documented and mature, and if data is publicly 
available, an attempt can be made to establish whether the policy produces relevant 
societal value. A country’s policy can be contrasted with the international standards on 
SOE governance and rationale, thus enabling auditors to determine whether policy is in line 
with accepted international standards on equity, economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
This is known as a problem-oriented approach to auditing, as it starts by asking ‘what 
problem does the policy seek to solve?’ Similarly, what hypotheses can be formulated for 
the causes of success or failure? (ISSAI 3100/60). 
Relevant performance audit questions for a problem-oriented approach:
• Which social problem does the policy seek to address?
• What is the policy’s intended outcome?
• What are the policy outputs?
• What were the original policy aims?
• Is there a gap between policy aims and policy implementation (resulting in outputs and 
outcome)?
• If so, what is the cause of this gap? What factor account for success or failure?
• What are the costs of the policy?
Corporate governance of SOEs 
The term ‘corporate governance’ refers to the structures and processes for the direction 
and control of enterprises. It specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
the organisation’s stakeholders (including shareholders, directors and managers) and 
articulates the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. Corporate 
governance therefore creates a structure for defining, implementing and monitoring an 
organisation’s goals and objectives and for ensuring accountability to stakeholders. Good 
corporate governance systems ensure that the business environment is fair and transparent, 
that company directors are held accountable for their actions, and that all contracts entered 
into by the organisations can be enforced.
Compared with private-sector companies, SOEs face distinct governance challenges that 
directly affect their performance (World Bank, 2014; OECD, 2015):
• Multiple principals
• Multiple and often competing goals and objectives
• Protection from competition
• Politicised boards and management
• Low levels of transparency and accountability
• Weak protection of minority shareholders
A growing number of publications point to the vulnerability of SOEs to corruption. Almost 
half of all SOEs that participated in a recent OECD survey identified a corrupt act or another 
irregularity. There was no other sector in which bribes were promised more often (OECD, 
2018: 20, 21). The IMF found that, in countries where corruption was widespread in the 
business sector, 71% of respondents attributed this to malpractices in SOEs (IMF, 2017: 97). 
9Table: Main corruption risks based on previous experiences with corruption (OECD, 2018: 29)
To counter these challenges, the boards of SOEs should be independent and competent, 
and they should be given authority to manage the SOE in question efficiently. The following 
international standards (OECD, 2015; World Bank, 2014) help to guarantee this:
• The broad framework of national SOE policy should act as a strategic guidance for the 
boards of SOEs. 
• The role and responsibilities of the boards of SOEs should be identical to those of other 
boards under corporate law. 
• The selection of board members should be based on merit and qualifications. 
• All board members, including civil servants, should have the same legal responsibilities. 
• The main objective of board members should be to attain the SOE’s long-term objectives 
and assure its continuity.  
It is therefore crucial that boards should have a clear mandate and ultimate responsibility 
for the performance of the SOE, for monitoring the SOE’;s management and for upholding 
corporate integrity. This means that the board should be responsible for appointing and 
dismissing the CEO. The board must be responsible for the annual, structured evaluation  
of the SOE’s performance and efficiency.  
The need for accountability and transparency dictates that financial figures and information 
on objectives, output and operation should be made publicly available. Internationally 
recognised standards for reporting and disclosure are key here. Reporting by SOEs should 
be subject to the same standards as reporting by private firms and listed companies. 
Reports should be scrutinised by an independent external auditor. The board should 
ensure that internal audit procedures are established and monitored (OECD, 2015; World 
Bank, 2014).
Audit standards for the governance of individual SOEs
If a government’s policy on SOEs is well-documented and mature, and if data on the 
performance of individual SOEs is publicly available, an attempt can be made to establish 
whether the policy works in practice, and to verify the output and performance of individual 
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SOEs. This is known as a result-oriented approach to auditing. Audits focus on the results 
of policy and the achievement of goals. The desired results and outputs are contrasted with 
the actual results and outputs (ISSAI 3100/59). 
Relevant performance audit questions in a result-oriented approach:
Does the auditee:
• formulate objectives? If so, are these SMART (i.e. Specific, Measurable, Attainable, 
Realistic and Time-bound) and consistent?
• define and describe the target group for the policy?
• define the required form and degree of coverage of the target group?
• describe the output to be delivered according to the objectives?
• provide sufficient budget and means in order to attain the objectives?
• inform the target group?
• reach the target group in the required form and to the required degree?
• ensure that relevant, reliable and valid information is available to provide evidence of 
the achievement of the objectives set?
• succeed in delivering the output?
• succeed in achieving the objectives?
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